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We examine the sales of French manufacturing firms in 113 destinations, including France itself. Several
regularities stand out: (1) the number of French firms selling to a market, relative to French market
share, increases systematically with market size; (2) sales distributions are very similar across markets
of very different size and extent of French participation; (3) average sales in France rise very systematically
with selling to less popular markets and to more markets. We adopt a model of firm heterogeneity
and export participation which we estimate to match moments of the French data using the method
of simulated moments. The results imply that nearly half the variation across firms that we see in market
entry can be attributed to a single dimension of underlying firm heterogeneity, efficiency. Conditional
on entry, underlying efficiency accounts for a much smaller variation in sales in any given market.
Parameter estimates imply that fixed costs eat up a little more than half of gross profits. We use our
results to simulate the effects of a counterfactual decline in bilateral trade barriers on French firms.
While total French sales rise by around US$16 billion, sales by the top decile of firms rise by nearly
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We exploit a detailed set of data on the exports of French ￿rms to confront a new generation
of trade theories. Those theories resurrect technological heterogeneity as the force driving
international trade. Eaton and Kortum (2002) develop a model relating di⁄erences in e¢ cien-
cies across countries in making di⁄erent goods to aggregate bilateral trade ￿ ows. Since they
focus only on aggregate data underlying heterogeneity across individual producers remains
hidden. Subsequent papers, particularly Melitz (2003) and Bernard, Eaton, Jensen, and Ko-
rtum (henceforth BEJK, 2003), have developed models in which ￿rm heterogeneity explicitly
underlies comparative advantage. An implication is that data on individual ￿rms can provide
another window on the determinants of international trade.
On the purely empirical side a literature has established a number of regularities about
￿rms in trade.1 Another literature has modeled and estimated the export decision of individual
￿rms in partial equilibrium.2 However, the task of building a structure that can simultaneously
embed behavior at the ￿rm level into aggregate relationships and dissect aggregate shocks into
their ￿rm-level components remains incomplete. This paper seeks to further this mission.
To this end we exploit detailed data on the sales of French manufacturing ￿rms in 113
destinations, including France itself. Combining these data with observations on aggregate
trade and production reveals striking regularities in: (1) patterns of entry across markets, (2)
the distribution of sales across markets, (3) how export participation connects with sales at
home, and (4) how sales abroad relate to sales at home.
1For example, Aw, Chung, and Roberts (1998), for Taiwan and Korea, and Bernard and Jensen (1999), for
the United States, document the size and productivity advantage of exporters.
2A pioneering paper here is Roberts and Tybout (1997).We adopt Melitz (2003), as augmented by Helpman, Melitz, and Yeaple (2004) and Chaney
(2008), as a basic framework for understanding these relationships. Core elements of the model
are that ￿rms￿e¢ ciencies follow a Pareto distribution, demand is Dixit-Stiglitz, and markets
are separated by iceberg trade barriers and require a ￿xed cost of entry. The model is the
simplest one we can think of that can square with the facts.
The basic model fails to come to terms with some features of the data, however: (1) Firms
don￿ t enter markets according to an exact hierarchy. (2) Their sales where they do enter
deviate from the exact correlations the basic model would insist upon. (3) Firms that export
sell too much in France. (4) In the typical destination there are too many ￿rms selling small
amounts.
To reconcile the basic model with the ￿rst two failures we introduce market and ￿rm-
speci￿c heterogeneity in entry costs and demand. We deal with the second two by incor-
porating Arkolakis￿ s (2008) formulation of market access costs. The extended model, while
remaining very parsimonious and transparent, is one that we can connect more formally to
the data. We describe how the model can be simulated and we estimate its main parameters
using the method of simulated moments.
Our parameter estimates imply that the forces underlying the basic model remain powerful.
Simply knowing a ￿rm￿ s e¢ ciency improves our ability to explain the probability it sells in
any market by ￿fty-seven percent. Conditional on a ￿rm selling in a market, knowing its
e¢ ciency improves our ability to predict how much it sells there, but by much less. While
these results leave much to be explained by the idiosyncratic interaction between individual
￿rms and markets, they tell us that any theory ignoring features of the ￿rm that are universal
2across markets misses much.
Our main estimation procedure eschews productivity measures since connecting them to
our model requires additional assumptions about various parameters of production that are
irrelevant to the model￿ s predictions for entry and sales. Looking at one simple measure of
productivity, value added per worker, we ￿nd that French ￿rms that export are 22 per cent
more productive than average. We ￿t additional parameters to match this ￿gure as well as
the share of intermediates in gross production.
With the parameterization complete we can put a number on the ￿home market e⁄ect,￿
the extent to which a larger market bene￿ts from more variety. We ￿nd the bene￿t of bigness
substantial: A doubling of demand for manufactures in a market lowers the manufacturing
price index by around 20 percent.
We conclude by using our parameterized model to examine two alternative scenarios: a
world with lower trade barriers and a world with lower entry costs. To do so we embed our
model into a general equilibrium framework. Calibrating the framework to data on production
and bilateral trade from our 113 countries and the rest of the world, we can examine the
implications of changes in exogenous parameters for income, wages, and prices in each country
and for bilateral trade. We can also use these counterfactual outcomes and our parameter
estimates to simulate the implications for French ￿rms. A striking ￿nding is that lower trade
barriers, while raising welfare in every country, result in substantially more inequality in the
distribution of ￿rm size. Even though total output of French ￿rms rises by 3.8 percent, all of
the growth is accounted for by ￿rms in the top decile. Sales in every other decile fall. Import
competition leads to the exit of 11.5 percent of ￿rms, 43 percent of which are in the smallest
3decile.
Section 2 which follows explores ￿ve empirical regularities. With these in mind in Section
3 we turn to a model of exporting by heterogeneous ￿rms. Section 4 explains how we estimate
the parameters of the model while section 5 explores the implications of lowering entry and
trade costs.
2 Empirical Regularities
Our data are the sales, translated into U.S. dollars, of 229,900 French manufacturing ￿rms to
113 markets in 1986. (Table 3 lists the countries.) Among them only 34,035 sell elsewhere
than in France. The ￿rm that exports most widely sells to 110 out of the 113 destinations.3
We assemble our complex data in four di⁄erent ways, each revealing sharp regularities:
3Appendix A describes the data. Biscourp and Kramarz (2007) and Eaton, Kortum, and Kramarz (EKK,
2004) use the same sources. EKK (2004) partition ￿rms into 16 manufacturing sectors. While features
vary across industries, enough similarity remains to lead us to ignore the industry dimension here. We have
dropped from our analysis 523 ￿rms whose total exports declared to French customs exceed their total sales
from mandatory reports to the French ￿scal administration. These ￿rms represent 1.51 percent of all French
exporters and account for 1.23 percent of the total French exports to our 112 export destinations. In our
estimation procedure, we will interpret these 523 French ￿rms as exporters that did not enter the domestic
market.
42.1 Market Entry
Figure 1a plots the number of French manufacturing ￿rms NnF selling to a market against total
manufacturing absorption Xn in that market across our 113 markets.4 While the number of
￿rms selling to a market tends clearly to increase with the size of the market, the relationship
is a cloudy one. Note in particular that more French ￿rms sell to France than its market size
would suggest.
The relationship comes into focus, however, when the number of ￿rms is normalized by
the share of France in a market. Figure 1b continues to report market size across the 113
destinations along the x axis. The y axis replaces the number of French ￿rms selling to a
market with that number divided by French market share, ￿nF; de￿ned as total exports of





Note that the relationship is not only very tight, but linear in logs. Correcting for market
share pulls France from the position of a large positive outlier to a slightly negative one. A
regression line has a slope of 0.65.
If we make the assumption that French ￿rms don￿ t vary systematically in size from other
(non-French) ￿rms selling in a market, the measure on the y axis indicates the total number
of ￿rms selling in a market. We can then interpret Figure 1b as telling us how the number of
sellers varies with market size.
Models of perfect and Bertrand competition and the standard model of monopolistic com-
4Manufacturing absorption is calculated as total production plus imports minus exports. See EKK (2004)
for details.
5petition without market-speci￿c entry costs predict that the number of sellers in a market is
invariant to market size. Figures 1a and 1b compel us to abandon these approaches.
While the number of ￿rms selling to a market rises with market size, so do sales per ￿rm.
Figure 1c shows the 95th, 75th, 50th, and 25th percentile sales in each market (on the y axis)
against market size (on the x axis). The upward drift is apparent across the board, indicating
the tendency of sales per ￿rm to increase with market size.
We now turn to ￿rm entry into di⁄erent sets of markets. As a starting point for this
examination, suppose ￿rms obey a hierarchy in the sense that any ￿rm selling to the k + 1st
most popular destination necessarily sells to the kth most popular destination as well. Not
surprisingly ￿rms are less orderly in their choice of destinations. A good metric of how far
they depart from a hierarchy is elusive. We can get some sense, however, by looking simply
at exporters to the top seven foreign destinations. Table 1 reports these destinations and the
number of ￿rms selling to each, as well as the total number of exporters. The last column of
the table reports, for each top 7 destination, the marginal probability of a French exporter
selling there. An upper bound on the fraction of ￿rms that obey a hierarchy is the 52 percent
of exporters who do sell in Belgium.
Table 2 lists each of the strings of destinations that obey a hierarchical structure, together
with the number of ￿rms selling to each string (irrespective of their export activity outside
the top 7). Note, for example, that 52 percent of the ￿rms that sell in Belgium adhere to a
hierarchy. The next column of Table 2 uses the marginal probabilities from Table 1 to predict
the number selling to each hierarchical string, if selling in one market is independent of selling
in any other of the top 7. Independence implies that only 13 percent of exporters would obey
6a hierarchy (e.g., selling to the UK only when also selling to both Belgium and Germany),
so that 87 percent would deviate from it (e.g., by selling to the UK but not also selling to
both Belgium and Germany). In fact more than twice that number, 27 percent, adhere to the
hierarchy. Note that many more sell to the shortest string (only Belgium) and to the three
longest strings than independence would imply. We conclude that a model needs to recognize
both a tendency for ￿rms to export according to a hierarchy while allowing them signi￿cant
latitude to depart from it.
2.2 Sales Distributions
Our second exercise is to look at the distribution of sales within individual markets. We plot
the sales of each ￿rm in a particular market (relative to mean sales there) against the fraction
of ￿rms selling in the market who sell at least that much.5 Doing so for all our 113 destinations
a remarkable similarity emerges. Figure 2 plots the results for Belgium, France, Ireland, and
the United States, on common axes. Since there are many fewer ￿rms exporting than selling
in France the upper percentiles in the foreign destinations are empty. Nonetheless, the shape
is about the same.
To interpret these ￿gures as distributions, let xq
n be the q￿ th percentile French sales in




where xn is sales of a ￿rm in market n relative to the mean. Suppose the sales distribution is
5Following Gabaix and Ibragimov (2008) we construct the x axis as follows. Denote the rank in terms of
sales of French ￿rm j in market n; among the NnF French ￿rms selling there, as rn(j); with the ￿rm with the
largest sales having rank 1. For each ￿rm j the point on the x axis is (rn(j) ￿ :5)=NnF:
7Pareto with parameter a > 1 (so that the minimum sales relative to the mean is (a ￿ 1)=a).




















implying a straight line with slope ￿1=a: At the top percentiles the slope does appear nearly
constant, and below ￿1; but at the lower tails it is much steeper, re￿ ecting the presence of
suppliers selling very small amounts.6 This shape is well known in the industrial organization
literature looking at various size measures.7 What we ￿nd here is that this shape is inherited
across markets looking at the same set of potential sellers.
Figure 1c provides a di⁄erent picture of how the distribution of sales is very similar across
markets. The lines for the four percentiles are roughly parallel on a log scale (although the
25th percentile is decidedly ￿ atter) indicating the common shape of sales distribution across
destinations.
2.3 Export Participation and Size in France
How does a ￿rm￿ s participation in export markets relate to its sales in France? We organize
our ￿rms in two di⁄erent ways based on our examination of their entry behavior above.
First, we group ￿rms according to the minimum number of destinations where they sell.
All of our ￿rms, of course, sell to at least one market while none sell to all 113 destinations.
6Considering only sales by the top 1 percent of French ￿rms selling in the four destinations depicted in
Figure 2, regressions yield slopes of -0.74 (Belgium), -0.87 (France), -0.69 (Ireland) and -0.82 (United States).
7See Simon and Bonini (1958) and Luttmer (2007), among many, for a discussion and explanations.
8Figure 3a depicts average sales in France on the y axis for the group of ￿rms that sell to at
least k markets with k on the x axis. Note the near monotonicity with which sales in France
rise with the number of foreign markets served.
Figure 3b reports average sales in France of ￿rms selling to k or more markets against the
number of ￿rms selling to k or more markets. The highly linear, in logs, negative relationship
between the number of ￿rms that export to a group of countries and their sales in France is
highly suggestive of a power law. The regression slope is -0.66.
Second, we rank countries according to their popularity as destinations for exports. The
most popular destination is of course France itself, where all of our ￿rms sell, followed by
Belgium with 17,699 exporters. The least popular is Nepal, where only 43 French ￿rms sell
(followed in unpopularity by Afghanistan and Uganda, with 52 each). Figure 3c depicts
average sales in France on the y axis plotted against the number of ￿rms selling to the kth
most popular market on the x axis. The relationship is tight and linear in logs as in Figure
3b, although slightly ￿ atter, with a slope of -0.57. Selling to less popular markets has a very
similar positive association with sales in France as selling to more markets.
We conclude that ￿rms selling to less popular markets and to more markets systematically
sell more in France. Delving further into the French sales of exporters to markets of varying
popularity, Figure 3d reports the 95th, 75th, 50th, and 25th percentile sales in France (on
the y axis) against the number of ￿rms selling to each market. Note the tendency of sales in
France to rise with the unpopularity of a destination across all percentiles (less systematically
so for the 25th percentile). A challenge for modeling is reconciling the stark linear (in logs)
relationships in Figures 3b, 3c, and 3d with the more nuanced size distributions in Figure 2.8
8We were able to observe the relationship between market popularity and sales in France for the 1992
92.4 Export Intensity
Having looked separately at what exporters sell abroad and what they sell in the French
market, we now examine the ratio of the two. We introduce the concept of a ￿rm j￿ s normalized




Here XnF(j) is French ￿rm j￿ s sales in market n and XnF are average sales by French ￿rms
in market n (XFF(j) and XFF are the corresponding magnitudes in France). Scaling by XnF
removes any e⁄ect of market n as it applies to sales of all French ￿rms there. Scaling by
XFF(j) removes any direct e⁄ect of ￿rm size.
Figure 4 plots the median and 95th percentile normalized export intensity for each foreign
market n (on the y axis) against the number of ￿rms selling to that market (on the x axis)
on log scales. Two aspects stand out.
First, as a destination becomes more popular, normalized export intensity rises. The
slope for the median is 0.38. Hence, if the number of sellers to a market rises by 10 percent,
normalized export intensity rises by around 4 percent, but the relationship is a noisy one.
Second, while we have excluded France from the ￿gure, its y coordinate would be 1. Note
that the y coordinates in the ￿gure are at least an order of magnitude below one. An additional
challenge for the model is to account for the tendency of exporters to sell so much at home.
cross-section as well. The analog (not shown) of Figure 3c is nearly identical. Furthermore, the changes
between 1986 and 1992 in the number of French ￿rms selling in a market correlates as it should with changes
in the mean sales in France of these ￿rms. The only glaring discrepancy is Iraq, where the number of French
exporters plummeted between the two years, while average sales in France did not skyrocket to the extent
that the relationship would dictate.
103 Theory
In seeking to explain these relationships we turn to a parsimonious model that delivers pre-
dictions about where ￿rms sell and how much they sell there. We infer the parameter values
of the model from our observations on French ￿rms. The basic structure is monopolistic com-
petition: goods are di⁄erentiated with each one corresponding to a ￿rm; selling in a market
requires a ￿xed cost while moving goods from country to country incurs iceberg transport
costs; ￿rms are heterogeneous in e¢ ciency as well as in other characteristics while countries
vary in size, location, and ￿xed cost of entry.
We begin with the determination of unit costs of di⁄erent products in di⁄erent countries
around the world (whether or not these products are produced or supplied in equilibrium).
Unit costs depend on input costs, trade barriers, and underlying heterogeneity in the e¢ ciency
of potential producers in di⁄erent countries.
3.1 Producer Heterogeneity
A potential producer of good j in country i has e¢ ciency zi(j): A bundle of inputs there costs
wi; so that the unit cost of producing good j is wi=zi(j): Countries are separated by iceberg
trade costs, so that delivering one unit of a good to country n from country i requires shipping
dni ￿ 1 units, where we set dii = 1 for all i: Combining these terms, the unit cost to this





The measure of potential producers in country i who can produce their good with e¢ ciency




￿￿ z > 0; (2)
where ￿ > 0 is a parameter.9 Using (1), the measure of goods that can be delivered from




























9We follow Helpman, Melitz, and Yeaple (2004) and Chaney (2007) in treating the underlying heterogeneity
in e¢ ciency as Pareto. Our observations above on patterns of sales by French ￿rms in di⁄erent markets are
very suggestive of an underlying Pareto distribution. A Pareto distribution of e¢ ciencies can arise naturally
from a dynamic process that is a history of independent shocks, as shown by Simon (1956), Gabaix (1999), and
Luttmer (2007). The Pareto distribution is closely linked to the type II extreme value (FrØchet) distribution
used in Kortum (1997), Eaton and Kortum (1999), Eaton and Kortum (2002), and BEJK (2003). Say that the
range of goods is limited to the interval j 2 [0;J] with the measure of goods produced with e¢ ciency at least
z given by: ￿Z





(where J = 1 in these previous papers). This generalization
allows us to stretch the range of goods while compressing the distribution of e¢ ciencies for any given good.






and apply L￿ H￿pital￿ s rule.)
12where ￿ni; which arises frequently in what follows, is invariant to c.
We now turn to demand and market structure in a typical destination.
3.2 Demand, Market Structure, and Entry
A market n contains a measure of potential buyers. In order to sell to a fraction f of them a
producer selling good j must incur a ￿xed cost:
En(j) = "n(j)EnM(f): (5)
Here "n(j) is a ￿xed-cost shock speci￿c to good j in market n and En is the component of
the cost shock faced by all who sell there, regardless of where they come from. The function
M(f); the same across destinations, relates a seller￿ s ￿xed cost of entering a market to the
share of consumers it reaches there. Any given buyer in the market has a chance f of accessing
the good while f is the fraction of buyers reached.
In what follows we use the speci￿cation for M(f) derived by Arkolakis (2008) from a model
of the microfoundations of marketing:
M(f) =
1 ￿ (1 ￿ f)1￿1=￿
1 ￿ 1=￿
;
where the parameter ￿ ￿ 0 re￿ ects the increasing cost of reaching a larger fraction of potential
buyers.10 This function has the desirable properties that the cost of reaching 0 buyers in a
market is 0 and that the total cost is increasing (and the marginal cost weakly increasing) in
the fraction f of buyers reached. Taking the limit ￿ ! 1 implies a constant marginal cost of
reaching an added buyer. Since buyers in a market turn out to be identical a seller would then
10By L￿ H￿pital￿ s Rule, at ￿ = 1 the function becomes M(f) = ￿ln(1 ￿ f):
13choose to reach either every potential buyer in a market or none at all, an outcome equivalent
to Melitz (2003). With ￿ ￿nite a seller might still stay out of a market entirely or make the
e⁄ort to reach only a small fraction of buyers there. A seller with a lower unit cost in a market
will optimally undertake greater e⁄ort to reach more buyers there.
Each potential buyer in market n has the same probability f of being reached by a particu-
lar seller that is independent across sellers. Hence each buyer can purchase the same measure
of goods, although the particular goods in question vary across buyers. Buyers combine goods
according to a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) aggregator with elasticity ￿, where
we require ￿￿1 > ￿ > 1: Hence we can write the aggregate demand for good j, if it has price






where Xn is total spending there. The term ￿n(j) re￿ ects an exogenous demand shock speci￿c
to good j in market n: The term Pn is the CES price index, which we derive below.
Conditional on selling in a market the producer of good j with unit cost cn(j) who charges












Xn ￿ "n(j)EnM(f): (6)
Given its unit cost cn(j) and idiosyncratic sales and ￿xed-cost shifters ￿n(j) and "n(j) this
expression is the same for any seller in market n regardless of its location. We now turn to
the pro￿t maximizing choices of p and f:































is the entry shock in market n given by the ratio of the demand shock to the ￿xed-cost shock.








We can now describe a seller￿ s behavior in market n in terms of its unit cost cn(j) = c;
demand shock ￿n(j) = ￿; and entry shock ￿n(j) = ￿: From the condition above, a ￿rm enters
market n if and only if:










We can use the expression for (9) to simplify the expression for the fraction of buyers a
producer with unit cost c ￿ cn(￿) will reach:













15Since it charges a markup m over unit cost its total gross pro￿t is simply:
￿
G(j) = Xn(j)=￿ (12)





To summarize, the relevant characteristics of market n that apply across sellers are total
purchases Xn, the price index Pn; and the common component of the ￿xed cost En: The par-
ticular situation of a potential seller of product j in market n is captured by three magnitudes:
the unit cost cn(j) and the demand and entry shocks ￿n(j) and ￿n(j). We treat ￿n(j) and
￿n(j) as the realizations of producer-speci￿c shocks drawn from a joint density g(￿;￿) that is
the same across destinations n and independent of cn(j).11
Equations (8) and (9), governing entry, and (11), governing sales conditional on entry,
link our theory to the data on French ￿rms￿entry and sales in di⁄erent markets of the world
described in Section 2. Before returning to the data, however, we need to solve for the price
index Pn in each market.
3.3 The Price Index
As described above, each buyer in market n has access to the same measure of goods (even
though they are not necessarily the same goods). Every buyer faces the same probability
fn(￿;c) of purchasing a good with cost c and entry shock ￿ for any value of ￿: Hence we can
11We require that E[￿￿=(￿￿1)] and E[￿￿[￿=(￿￿1)]￿1] are both ￿nite. For any given g(￿;￿), these restrictions
will imply an upper bound on the parameter ￿.
16write the price index Pn faced by a representative buyer in market n as:
Pn = m
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￿ ￿ (￿ ￿ 1)
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Note that the price index relates to total expenditure relative to the entry cost with an
elasticity of (1=￿) ￿ 1=(￿ ￿ 1): Our restriction that ￿ > ￿ ￿ 1 assures that the e⁄ect is
negative: A larger market enjoys lower prices, a manifestation of Krugman￿ s (1980) ￿home
market e⁄ect￿common across models of monopolistic competition. Our parameter estimates
will give us a sense of its magnitude.
Having solved for the price index Pn we return to the sales and entry of an individual ￿rm
there.
173.4 Firm Entry and Sales
We can now restate the conditions for entry, (8) and (9), and the expression for sales condi-
tional on entry, (11), in terms of the parameters underlying the price index. A ￿rm j with
unit cost c and sales and entry shocks ￿ and ￿ will enter market n if c and ￿ satisfy:
c ￿ cn(￿):


































Note that " has replaced ￿ as the shock to sales. Firms that pay a higher entry cost must sell
more for entry to be worthwhile.
Knowing now what an individual ￿rm does in market n, we turn to aggregate ￿rm behavior
in that market.
3.5 Aggregate Entry and Sales
For ￿rms with a given ￿ in market n a measure ￿n(cn(￿)) will pass the entry hurdle. Integrating

















Note that this measure rises in proportion to Xn.12
Suppliers to market n have heterogeneous costs. But, conditional on entry, suppliers from
each source country i have the same distribution of unit costs in n. To see why, consider good
j in market n with entry shock ￿. For any cost c less than the entry threshold, the fraction
of suppliers from i with cni(j) ￿ c among those with cni(j) ￿ cn(￿) is simply
￿ni(c)=￿ni(cn(￿)) = [c=cn(￿)]
￿
for any c ￿ cn(￿). Hence for any ￿ this proportion does not depend on source i. Since we
assume that the distribution of ￿ is independent of i, while di⁄erent sources may have di⁄erent
measures of suppliers selling in market n, all who do sell will have the same distribution of
unit costs.
Hence, given the constant markup over unit cost, suppliers from any source have the same
distribution of prices in n and, hence, of sales. An implication is that the fraction of entrants






where Xni is n￿ s purchases of goods originating from i. This relationship gives us a connection
between the cluster of parameters embedded in ￿ni in (4) above and data on trade shares.
12In describing the data we used N to indicate a number of ￿rms (an integer, of course). Since the theory
implies a continuum of ￿rms we use J to denote a measure of producers.
19Combining (18) and (20), we get that the measure of ￿rms from country i selling in country
n is:






Hence the measure of ￿rms from source i in destination n is proportional to i￿ s trade share








The distribution of sales in a particular market, and hence mean sales there, is invariant to
the location i of the supplier.
3.6 Fixed Costs and Pro￿ts
Since our model is one of monopolistic competition, producers charge a markup over unit cost.
If total spending in a market is Xn then gross pro￿ts earned by ￿rms in that market are Xn=￿:
If ￿rms were homogeneous then ￿xed costs would fully dissipate pro￿ts. But, with producer
heterogeneity, ￿rms with a unit cost below the entry cuto⁄ in a market earn a positive pro￿t
there. Here we solve for the share of pro￿ts that are dissipated by ￿xed costs. While not used
in our estimation below, this derivation delivers a useful implication of the model which we
can quantify once we have estimated the model￿ s parameters.









Integrating across the range of unit costs consistent with entry into destination n (given ￿),























[￿=(￿ ￿ 1)] + ￿ ￿ 1
￿
:
Integrating across the joint density of ￿ and ￿; inserting (15), we get that total ￿xed costs in







[￿ ￿ (￿ ￿ 1)]: (24)
Thus total entry costs are a fraction [￿ ￿ (￿ ￿ 1)]=￿ of the gross pro￿ts Xn=￿ earned in any
destination n. Net pro￿ts earned in market n are simply Xn=(m￿). Note that En (spending
on ￿xed costs) does not depend on En; the country component of the ￿xed cost per ￿rm, just
as in standard models of monopolistic competition. A drop in En leads to more entry and
hence the same total spending on ￿xed costs.
3.7 A Streamlined Representation
We now employ a change of variables that simpli￿es the model in two respects. First, it allows
us to characterize unit cost heterogeneity in terms of a uniform measure. Second, it allows us
to consolidate parameters.
To isolate the heterogeneous component of unit costs we transform the e¢ ciency of any
potential producer in France as:
u(j) = TFzF(j)
￿￿: (25)
21We refer to u(j) as ￿rm j￿ s standardized unit cost. From (2), the measure of ￿rms with
standardized unit cost below u equals the measure with e¢ ciency above (TF=u)1=￿; which is
simply ￿z
F((TF=u)1=￿) = u: Hence standardized costs have a uniform measure that doesn￿ t
depend on any parameters.






















Firm j will enter market n if its u(j) and ￿n(j) satisfy:












Conditional on ￿rm j￿ s passing this hurdle we can use (26) and (27) to rewrite ￿rm j￿ s












Equations (28) and (30) reformulate the entry and sales equations (16) and (17) in terms of
u(j) rather than cn(j):
Since standardized unit cost u(j) applies across all markets, it gets to the core of a ￿rm￿ s
underlying e¢ ciency as it applies to its entry and sales in di⁄erent markets. Notice that in
22reformulating the model as (28) and (30), the two parameters ￿ and ￿ enter only collectively
through the parameter e ￿: It translates unobserved heterogeneity in u(j) into observed hetero-
geneity in sales. A higher value of ￿ implies less heterogeneity in e¢ ciency while a higher value
of ￿ means that a given level of heterogeneity in e¢ ciency translates into greater heterogeneity
in sales. Observing just entry and sales we are able to identify only e ￿:
3.8 Connecting the Model to the Empirical Regularities
We now show how the model can deliver the features of the data about entry and sales
described in Section 2. We quantify the measure of French ￿rms JnF selling in each destination
with the actual (integer) number NnF and their average sales their with XnF = XnF=NnF.
3.8.1 Entry









a relationship between the number of French ￿rms selling to market n relative to French
market share and the size of market n; just like the one plotted in Figure 1b. The fact that
the relationship is tight with a slope that is positive but less than one suggests that entry cost
￿En rises systematically with market size, but not proportionately so.










directly from the data.
23We can use equation (32) to examine how ￿xed costs vary with country characteristics.
Regressing XnF against our market size measure (both in logs) yields a slope of 0.31 (with a
standard error of 0.02). This relationship relates to the slope in Figure 1b, showing that the
number of entrants rises with market size with an elasticity of 0.65. Larger markets attract
more ￿rms, but not in proportion, since the cost of entry rises as well. The ￿rms that do enter
sell more, generating an elasticity of total sales with respect to market size of 0.96 (close to
the gravity prediction that imports vary with market size with a unit elasticity).13
Using (32) we can write (28) in terms of observables as:





Without variation in the ￿rm and market speci￿c entry shock ￿n(j); (33) would imply e¢ ciency
is all that would matter for entry, dictating a deterministic ranking of destinations with a less
e¢ cient ￿rm (with a higher u(j)) selling to a subset of the destinations served by any more
e¢ cient ￿rm. Hence deviations from market hierarchies identify variation in ￿n(j): As Table
2 illustrates, there is some tendency for ￿rms to enter markets according to a hierarchy, but
it is a loose one.
13If we include the log of 1986 real GDP per capita (from the World Bank￿ s World Development Indicators)
as an additional right-hand side variable, the coe¢ cient on the log of market size rises to 0.41 (standard error
0.03) while the coe¢ cient on the log of real GDP per capita is -0.29 (standard error 0.06). Hence while larger
markets have a higher ￿xed cost of entry, given size the cost is lower in richer countries. We were not able to
obtain 1986 real GDP per capita for 10 of our 113 destinations (Albania, Angola, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia,
East Germany, Libya, USSR, Vietnam, Yugoslavia, and Zaire). Hence this second regression was performed
on the remaining 103 countries. (The coe¢ cient on the log of market size in the univariate regression for this
smaller group is 0.30, hardly di⁄erent from that for the larger group.)
243.8.2 Sales in a Market
To get further insight into what our speci￿cation implies for the distribution of sales within a





is distributed uniformly on [0;1]: Replacing u(j) with vn(j) in expression (30) and exploiting










Not only does vn have the same distribution in each market n, so does "n.14 Hence the
distribution of sales in any market n is identical up to a scaling factor equal to XnF (re￿ ecting
variation in ￿En). Hence we can generate the common shapes of sales distributions exhibited in
Figure 2. The variation introduced by "n explains why the sales distribution in a market might
inherit the lognormal characteristics apparent in that Figure. A further source of curvature
is the term in square brackets, representing the fraction of buyers reached. As vn(j) goes to
one, with ￿nite ￿; the fraction approaches zero, capturing the curvature of sales distributions
at the lower end, as observed in Figure 2. Finally the term vn(j)￿1=e ￿ instills Pareto features
into the distribution. These features will be more pronounced as vn(j) approaches zero since
14To see that the distribution of "n(j) is the same in any n consider the joint density of ￿ and ￿ conditional







which does not depend on n: The term ￿
e ￿=￿2 captures the fact that entrants are a selective sample with
typically better than average entry shocks.
25very e¢ cient ￿rms will be reaching almost all buyers.
3.8.3 Sales in France Conditional on Entry in a Foreign Market
We can also look at the sales in France of French ￿rms selling to any market n. To condition
on these ￿rms￿selling in market n we take (35) as it applies to France and use (34) and (33)






















By expressing (36) in terms of vn(j) we can exploit the fact that (given entry in n) vn(j) is
uniformly distributed on the unit interval. Note that since all the other terms on the right-
hand of (36) have the same value or distribution across markets, NnF is the only systematic
source of variation across n; entering in two places both times as a ratio to NFF:
Consider ￿rst its presence in the term in square brackets, representing the fraction of
buyers reached in France. Since NnF=NFF is near zero everywhere but France, the term in
square brackets is close to one for all n 6= F. Hence the relationship between NnF and XFF(j)
is dominated by the appearance of NnF outside the square bracket, implying that sales in
France of ￿rms fall with NnF with an elasticity of ￿1=e ￿: Interpreting Figure 3c in terms of
Equation (35), the slope of -0.57 implies a e ￿ of 1.75.
Expression (36) also suggests how we can identify other parameters of the model. The gap
between the percentiles in Figure 3d is governed by the variation in the demand shock ￿F in
France together with variation in the entry shock ￿n(j) in country n.
Together (35) and (36) reconcile the near loglinearity of sales in France with NnF and the
extreme curvature at the lower end of the sales distribution in any given market. An exporting
26￿rm may be close to the entry cuto⁄ unit cost in the export market, and hence selling to a
small fraction of buyers there, while reaching most consumers at home. Hence looking at the
home sales of exporters isolates ￿rms that reach most of the market. These equations also
explains why France itself is somewhat below the trend line in Figures 3a and 3b. Once we
include nonexporters we suddenly have many ￿rms reaching a small fraction of the market.
3.8.4 Normalized Export Intensity














1 ￿ vn(j)￿=e ￿
















Figure 4 plots the median and 95th percentile of this statistic for French ￿rms across export
markets. Note ￿rst how the presence of the sales shock ￿n(j) accommodates random variation
in sales in di⁄erent markets conditional upon entry.
As in (36), the only systematic source of cross-country variation on the right-hand side
is in the number of French ￿rms. In contrast to (35) and (36), however, the ￿rm￿ s overall
e¢ ciency vn(j) has no direct e⁄ect on normalized export intensity since it cancels (having
the same e⁄ect in n as it has in France). For n = F the relationship collapses to an identity
1 = 1. As discussed above, for n 6= F NnF ￿ NFF; implying that the term in square brackets
is much less than one. Hence our model explains the low numbers on the y axis of Figure 4.
Aside from this general collapse of sales to any export market n relative to sales in France,
the last term in Equation (37) predicts that normalized export intensity will increase with
the number of French ￿rms selling there, the relationship portrayed in Figure 4. The reason
is that the harder the market is to enter (i.e., the lower NnF=NFF); the lower is unit cost
27in France, but the distribution in foreign destination n is the same. According to (37) the
elasticity of normalized export intensity with respect to NnF=NFF is 1=e ￿: The slope coe¢ cient
of 0.38 reported in Section 2.5 suggests a value of e ￿ of 2.63.15
To say more about the connection between the model and the data we need to go to the
computer.
4 Estimation
We estimate the parameters of the model by the method of simulated moments. We begin
by completing our parameterization of the model. We then explain how we simulate a set of
arti￿cial French exporters given a particular set of parameter values, with each ￿rm assigned
a cost draw u and an ￿ and ￿ in each market. We then describe how we calculate a set of
moments from these arti￿cial data to compare with moments from the actual data. We then
explain our estimation procedure, report our results, and examine the model￿ s ￿t.
4.1 Parameterization
To complete the speci￿cation, we assume that g(￿;￿) is joint lognormal. Speci￿cally, ln￿ and
ln￿ are normally distributed with zero means and variances ￿2
a; ￿2
h; and correlation ￿: Under
15In relating equation (36) to Figures 3c and 3d and equation (37) to Figure 4 a slight discrepancy arises.
The theory admits the possibility that a ￿rm might not sell in France but could still sell elsewhere. Hence
XFF(j) in these equations actually applies to what ￿rm j￿ s sales in France would be if it did enter. Obviously,
we don￿ t have data on latent sales in France for ￿rms that don￿ t sell there. But because the French share in
France is so much larger than the French share elsewhere, a French ￿rm selling in another market but not in
France is very unlikely. Hence the discrepancy is minor.
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which is decreasing in ￿.
Our estimation conditions on the actual data for: (i) French sales in each of our 113 desti-
nations, XnF, and (ii) the number of French ￿rms selling there, NnF.16 With this conditioning
our model has only ￿ve parameters
￿ = fe ￿;￿;￿a;￿h;￿g:
For a given ￿ we use (32) to back out the cluster of parameters ￿En using our data on
XnF = XnF=NnF and the ￿1 and ￿2 implied by (38) and (39). Similarly, we use (33) to back
out a ￿rm￿ s entry hurdle in each market un(￿n) given its ￿n and the ￿2 implied by (39).
4.2 Simulation
For estimating parameters, for assessing the implications of those estimates, and for perform-
ing counterfactual experiments, we will need to construct sets of arti￿cial French ￿rms that
16The model predicts that some French ￿rms will export while not selling domestically. Consequently, the
data for NnF and XnF that we condition on in our estimation include the 523 French exporters who don￿ t
enter the domestic market. See footnote 3 above.
29operate as the model tells them, given some ￿. We refer to an arti￿cial French exporter by
s and the number of such exporters by S: The number S does not bear any relationship to
the number of actual French exporters. A larger S implies less sampling variation in our
simulations.
As we search over di⁄erent parameters ￿ we want to hold ￿xed the realizations of the
stochastic components of the model. Hence, prior to running any simulations: (i) We draw
realizations of v(s)￿ s independently from the uniform distribution U[0;1], for s = 1;:::;S;
putting them aside to construct standardized unit cost u(s) below. (ii) We draw S ￿ 113















putting them aside to construct the ￿n(s) and ￿n(s) below.
Here we describe how to simulate a set of exporting ￿rms that sell in France, as these are
the ￿rms whose moments we seek to match in our estimation. As we explain below, it is easy
to modify the routine to include nonexporters and ￿rms not selling in France, as we do in
drawing out implications of the model and in performing counterfactual experiments.
A given simulation of the model requires a set of parameters ￿ and data for each destination
n on total sales XnF by French exporters and the number NnF of French ￿rms selling there.
It involves seven steps:
1. Using (38) and (39) we calculate ￿1 and ￿2.
2. Using (32) we calculate ￿En for each destination n.





























the maximum u consistent with exporting somewhere, and
u(s) = minfuF(s);u
X(s)g; (41)
the maximum u consistent with selling in France and exporting somewhere. To simulate
exporters that sell in France we want u(s) ￿ u(s) for each arti￿cial exporter s, hence
u(s) should be a realization from the uniform distribution over the interval [0;u(s)].
Therefore we construct:
u(s) = v(s)u(s):
using the v(s)￿ s that were drawn prior to the simulation.
6. In the model a measure u of ￿rms have standardized unit cost below u. Our arti￿cial
French exporter s therefore gets an importance weight u(s). This importance weight will
be used in constructing statistics on arti￿cial French exporters that relate to statistics
on actual French exporters.17
17See GouriØroux and Monfort (1995, Chapter 5) for a discussion of the use of importance weights in
simulation.
317. We calculate ￿nF(s), which indicates whether arti￿cial exporter s enters market n, as
determined by the entry hurdles:
￿nF(s) =
￿
1 if u(s) ￿ un(s)
0 otherwise.














This procedure gives us the behavior of S arti￿cial French exporters. We know three things
about each one: where it sells, ￿nF(s); how much it sells there, XnF(s), and its importance
weight, u(s). From these we can compute any moment that could have been constructed from
the actual French data.
4.3 Moments
In our estimation, we simulate ￿rms that make it into at least one foreign market and into
France as well. The reason for the ￿rst requirement is that ￿rms that sell only in France are
very numerous, and hence capturing them would consume a large portion of simulation draws.
But since their activity is so limited they add little to parameter identi￿cation.18 The reason
for the second requirement is that key moments in our estimation procedure are based on sales
in France by exporters, which we can compute only for ￿rms that sell in the home market.19
Given parameter estimates, we later explore the implications of the model for nonexporters
as well.
18We also estimated the model matching moments of nonexporting ￿rms as well. Coe¢ cient estimates were
similar to those we report below but the estimation algorithm, given estimation time, was much less precise.
19As mentioned in footnote 3, there are only 523 ￿rms that apparently do not sell in France.
32For a candidate value ￿ we use the algorithm above to simulate the sales of 500;000
arti￿cial French exporting ￿rms in 113 markets. From these arti￿cial data we compute a
vector of moments b m(￿) analogous to particular moments m in the actual data.
Our moments are the number of ￿rms that fall into sets of exhaustive and mutually exclu-
sive bins, where the number of ￿rms in each bin is counted in the data and is simulated from
the model. Let Nk be the number of ￿rms achieving some outcome k in the actual data and
e Nk the corresponding number in the simulated data. Using ￿
k(s) as an indicator for when









We now describe the moments that we seek to match.20
We have chosen our moments to capture the four features of French ￿rms￿behavior de-
scribed in Section 2: (1) their entry into particular subsets of export markets, (2) their sales
in export destination n, (3) their sales in France conditional on selling to n, and (4) their sales
in n relative to their sales in France conditional on selling to n:
1. The ￿rst set of moments relate to the entry strings discussed in Section 2.1. We compute
the proportion b mk(1;￿) of simulated exporters selling to each possible combination k
of the seven most popular export destinations (listed in Table 1). One possibility is
exporting yet selling to none of the top seven, giving us 27 possible combinations (so
that k = 1;:::;128). The corresponding moments from the actual data are simply the
proportion mk(1) of exporters selling to combination k: Stacking these proportions gives
20Notice, from (40), (41), and (19), that the average of the importance weights u(s) is the simulated number
of French ￿rms that export and sell in France.
33us b m(1;￿) and m(1); each with 128 elements (subject to 1 adding up constraint).
2. The second set of moments relate to the sales distributions presented in Section 2.2.
For ￿rms selling in each of the 112 export destinations n we compute the qth percentile
sales sq
n(2) in that market (i.e., the level of sales such that a fraction q of ￿rms selling
in n sells less than sq
n(2)) for q = 50; 75; 95. Using these sq
n(2) we assign ￿rms that
sell in n into four mutually exclusive and exhaustive bins determined by these three
sales levels. We compute the proportions b mn(2;￿) of arti￿cial ￿rms falling into each
bin analogous to the actual proportion mn(2) = (0:5;0:25;0:2;0:05)0. Stacking across
the 112 countries gives us b m(2;￿) and m(2), each with 448 elements (subject to 112
adding-up constraints).
3. The third set of moments relate to the sales in France of exporting ￿rms discussed in
Section 2.3. For ￿rms selling in each of the 112 export destinations n we compute the
qth percentile sales sq
n(3) in France for q = 50; 75; 95. Proceeding as above we get
b m(3;￿) and m(3); each with 448 elements (subject to 112 adding-up constraints).
4. The fourth set of moments relate to normalized export intensity by market discussed
in Section 2.4. For ￿rms selling in each of the 112 export destinations n we compute
the qth percentile ratio sq
n(4) of sales in n to sales in France for q = 50; 75. Proceeding
as above we get b m(4;￿) and m(4); each with 336 elements (subject to 112 adding-up
constraints).
For the last three sets we emphasize higher percentiles because they (i) appear less noisy
in the data and (ii) account for much more of total sales.
34Stacking the four sets of moments gives us a 1360-element vector of deviations between
the moments of the actual and arti￿cial data:




m(1) ￿ b m(1;￿)
m(2) ￿ b m(2;￿)
m(3) ￿ b m(3;￿)





We base our estimation procedure on the moment condition:
E[y(￿0)] = 0
where ￿0 is the true value of ￿: We thus seek a b ￿ that achieves:




where W is a 1360 ￿ 1360 weighting matrix. We search for ￿ using the simulated annealing
algorithm.21 At each function evaluation involving a new value of ￿ we compute a set of
500,000 arti￿cial ￿rms and construct the moments for them as described above. The simulated
annealing algorithm converges in 1 to 3 days on a standard PC.
The weighting matrix is the generalized inverse of the estimated variance-covariance matrix
￿ of the 1360 moments calculated from the data m. We calculate ￿ using the following
bootstrap procedure:
1. We resample, with replacement, 229,900 ￿rms from our initial dataset 2000 times.
21Go⁄e, Ferrier, and Rogers (1994) describe the algorithm. We use a version developed speci￿cally for Gauss
and available on the web from William Go⁄e (Simann).
352. For each resampling b we calculate mb, the proportion of ￿rms that fall into each of the
1360 bins, holding the destination strings ￿xed to calculate mb(1) and the sq
n(￿) ￿xed















Because of the adding up constraints this matrix has rank 1023, forcing us to take its
generalized inverse to compute W.
We calculate standard errors using a bootstrap technique, taking into account both sam-
pling error and simulation error. To account for sampling error each bootstrap b replaces
m with a di⁄erent mb. To account for simulation error each bootstrap b samples a new set
of 500,000 vb￿ s, ab
n￿ s, and hb
n￿ s as described in Section 4.2, thus generating a new b mb(￿).22
De￿ning yb(￿) = mb ￿ b mb(￿) for each b we search for:















b ￿b ￿ b ￿
￿￿
b ￿b ￿ b ￿
￿0
and take the square roots of the diagonal elements as the standard errors.23
22Just like mb; b mb is calculated according to the bins de￿ned from the actual data.
23Since we pursue our bootstrapping procedure only to calculate standard errors rather than to perform
tests we do not recenter the moments to account for the initial mis￿t of our model. Recentering would involve
setting:
yb(￿) = mb ￿ b mb(￿) ￿ (m ￿ b m(b ￿)):
364.5 Results
The best ￿t is achieved at the following parameter values (with bootstrapped standard errors
in parentheses):
e ￿ ￿ ￿a ￿h ￿
2:46 0:91 1:69 0:34 ￿0:65
(0:10) (0:12) (0:03) (0:01) (0:03)
Our discussion in Section 3.7 foreshadowed our estimate of e ￿; which lies between the slopes
in Figures 3c and Figure 4. From equations (35), (33), and (34), the characteristic of a ￿rm
determining both entry and sales conditional on entry, is v￿1=e ￿, where v ￿ U[0;1]. Our
estimate of e ￿ implies that the ratio of the 75th to the 25th percentile of this term is 1:56.
Another way to assess the magnitude of e ￿ is by its implication for aggregate ￿xed costs of
entry. Using expression (24), our estimate of 2.46 implies that ￿xed costs dissipate about 59
percent of gross pro￿t in any destination.
Our estimate of ￿a implies enormous idiosyncratic variation in sales across destinations. In
particular, the ratio of the 75th to the 25th percentile of the sales shock ￿ is 9:78: In contrast,
our estimate of ￿h means much less idiosyncratic variation in the entry shock ￿, with a ratio of
the 75th to 25th percentile equal to 1:58: As we show more systematically below, the feature
of a ￿rm that is common across countries explains relatively little of the variation in sales
conditional on entry, but more than half of the variation in entry.
A feature of the data is the entry of ￿rms into markets where they sell very little, as seen in
Figure 1c. Two features of our estimates reconcile these small sales with a ￿xed cost of entry.
First, our estimate of ￿, which is close to one, means that a ￿rm that is close to the entry
above. In fact, our experiments with recentered moments yielded similar estimates of the standard errors. See
Horowitz (2001) for an authoritative explanation.
37cuto⁄incurs a very small entry cost.24 Second, the negative covariance between the sales and
entry shocks explains why a ￿rm with a given u might enter a market and sell relatively little.
The ￿rst applies to ￿rms that di⁄er systematically in their e¢ ciency while the second applies
to the luck of the draw in individual markets.25
4.6 Model Fit
We can evaluate the model by seeing how well it replicates features of the data described in
Section 2. To glean a set of predictions of our model we use our parameter estimates b ￿ to
simulate a set of arti￿cial ￿rms including nonexporters.26 We then compare four features of
these arti￿cial ￿rms with corresponding features of the actual ones.
Entry. Since our estimation routine conditions entry hurdles on the actual number of
French ￿rms selling in each market, our simulation would hit these numbers were it not
24Arkolakis (2008) ￿nds a value around one consistent with various observations from several countries.
25We perform a Monte Carlo test of the ability of our estimation procedure to recover parameter values.
We simulate 230,000 arti￿cial French ￿rms with the estimated parameter values reported above. To do so
step 5 of the simulation algorithm was altered to u(s) = uF(s). We then apply the estimation procedure,
exactly as described, to these simulated data to estimate ￿ (using the same weighting matrix W as in the
original estimation). The table below reports the values used to create the simulated data (the ￿truth￿ ) and
the parameter estimates the estimation procedure delivers:
e ￿ ￿ ￿a ￿h ￿
￿truth￿ 2:46 0:91 1:69 0:34 ￿0:65
estimates 2:54 0:67 1:69 0:32 ￿0:56
Our estimates land in the same ballpark as the true parameters, with deviations in line with the standard
errors reported above.
26Here we simulate the behavior of S = 230;000 arti￿cial ￿rms, both nonexporters and exporters that sell
in France, to mimic more closely features of the raw data behind our analysis. Thus in step 5 in the simulation
algorithm we reset u(s) = uF(s).
38for simulation error. The total number of exporters is a di⁄erent matter since the model
determines the extent to which the same ￿rms are selling to multiple countries. We simulate
31,852 exporters, somewhat below the actual number of 34,035. Table 2 displays all the export
strings that obey a hierarchy out of the 128 subsets of the 7 most popular export destinations.
The ￿rst column is the actual number of French ￿rms selling to that string of countries while
the last column display the simulated number. In the data 27.2 percent of exporters adhere
to hierarchies compared with 30.3 percent in the model simulation, 13.3 percent implied by
simply predicting on the basis of the marginal probabilities, and 100 percent had there been
no entry shock (￿h = 0). In addition the model captures very closely the number selling to
each of the seven di⁄erent strings that obey a hierarchy.
Sales in a Market. Equation (35) in Section 3.7 motivates Figure 5a, which plots the
simulated (x￿ s) and actual (circles) values of the median and 95th percentile sales to each
market against actual mean French sales in that market. The model captures very well both
the distance between the two percentiles in any given market and how each percentile varies
across markets. The model also nearly matches the amount of noise in these percentiles,
especially in markets where mean sales are small.
Sales in France Conditional on Entry in a Foreign Market. Equation (36) in
Section 3.7 motivates Figure 5b, which plots the median and 95th percentile sales in France of
￿rms selling to each market against the actual number of ￿rms selling there. Again, the model
picks up the spread in the distribution as well as the slope. It also captures the fact that the
data point for France is below the line, re￿ ecting the marketing technology parameterized by
￿. The model understates noise in these percentiles in markets served by a small number of
39French ￿rms.
Export Intensity. Equation (37) in Section 3.7 motivates Figure 5c, which plots median
normalized export intensity in each market against the actual number of French ￿rms selling
there. The model picks up the low magnitude of normalized export intensity and how it varies
with the number of ￿rms selling in a market. Despite our high estimate of ￿a; however, the
model understates the noisiness of the relationship.
4.7 Sources of Variation
In our model, variation across ￿rms in entry and sales re￿ ects both di⁄erences in their under-
lying e¢ ciency, which applies across all markets, and idiosyncratic entry and sales shocks in
individual markets. We ask how much of the variation in entry and in sales can be explained
by the universal rather than the idiosyncratic components.
4.7.1 Variation in Entry
We ￿rst calculate the fraction of the variance of entry in each market that can be explained
by the cost draw u alone. By the law of large numbers, the fraction of French ￿rms selling in






The unconditional variance of entry for a randomly chosen French ￿rm is therefore:
V
U
n = qn (1 ￿ qn): (43)




Since ￿n is lognormally distributed with mean 0 and variance ￿h the probability that this
condition is satis￿ed is:





where ￿ is the standard normal cumulative density. The variance conditional on u is therefore:
V
C
n (u) = qn(u)[1 ￿ qn(u)]:
A natural measure (similar to R2 in a regression) of the explanatory power of the ￿rm￿ s cost
draw for market entry is
R
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using the techniques employed in our estimation routine,
with 230,000 simulated ￿rms, obtaining a value of RE
n for each of our 112 export markets.
The results indicate that we can attribute around 57 percent of the variation in entry in a
market to the core e¢ ciency of the ￿rm rather than to its draw of ￿ in that market.27
4.7.2 Variation in Sales
Looking at the ￿rms that enter a particular market, how much does the variation in u explain
the variation in their sales there. Consider ￿rm j selling in market n: Inserting (33) into (30),
27The average value across markets is 0:57; with a standard deviation of 0:01. The reason for so little
systematic variation in RE
n across markets is that, conditioning on u; the probability qn that a ￿rm sells in
any market n other than France is small. Taking the limit as qn ! 0; RE
n is independent of n:





























where we have divided sales into four components. Component 4 is common to all ￿rms selling
in market n so does not contribute to variation in sales there. The ￿rst component involves
￿rm j￿ s idiosyncratic sales shock in market n while component 3 involves its e¢ ciency shock
that applies across all markets. Complicating matters is component 2, which involves both
￿rm j￿ s idiosyncratic entry shock in market n; ￿n(j); and its overall e¢ ciency shock, u(j): We
deal with this issue by ￿rst asking how much of the variation in lnXn(j) is due to variation
in component 3 and then in the variation in components 2 and 3 together.
We simulate sales of 230,000 ￿rms across our 113 markets, and divide the contribution of
each component to its sales in each market where it sells. We ￿nd that component 3 itself
contributes only around 4:8 percent of the variation in lnXnF(j); and components 2 and 3
together around 39 percent.28
Together these results indicate that the general e¢ ciency of a ￿rm is very important in
explaining its entry into di⁄erent markets, but makes a much smaller contribution to the
variation in the sales of ￿rms actually selling in a market. This ￿nding follows from our much
higher estimate of ￿a relative to ￿h.29
28Again, 0:048 and 0:39 are averages across markets, with respective standard deviations 0:0003 and 0:0025:
The presence of NnF in component 2 makes the contribution of each component vary across markets, but the
di⁄erences are very small.
29A lower value of e ￿ (implying more sales heterogeneity attributable to e¢ ciency), for given ￿a and ￿h;
would lead us to attribute more to the ￿rm￿ s underlying e¢ ciency rather than to destination-speci￿c shocks.
424.8 Productivity
Our methodology so far has allowed us to estimate e ￿, which incorporates both underlying
heterogeneity in e¢ ciency, as re￿ ected in ￿, and how this heterogeneity in e¢ ciency gets
translated into sales, through ￿. In order to break down e ￿ into these components we turn to
data on ￿rm productivity, as measured by value added per worker, and how it di⁄ers among
￿rms selling to di⁄erent numbers of markets.30
A common observation is that exporters are more productive (according to various mea-
sures) than the average ￿rm.31 The same is true of our exporters here: The average value
added per worker of exporters is 1:22 times the average for all ￿rms. Moreover, value added
per worker, like sales in France, tends to rise with the number of markets served, but not with
nearly as much regularity.
A reason for this relationship in our model is that a more e¢ cient ￿rm, with a lower
normalized unit cost u(j); will typically both enter more markets and sell more widely in any
given market. As its ￿xed costs are not proportionately higher, larger sales get translated
into higher value added relative to inputs used, including those used in ￿xed costs. An
o⁄setting factor is that iceberg transport costs make serving foreign markets a less productive
endeavor than supplying the home market. Determining the net e⁄ect requires a quantitative
assessment.
How do we calculate productivity among our simulated ￿rms? Because it provides a
30Because value added per worker is a crude productivity measure, we didn￿ t incorporate these numbers into
our method of simulated moments estimation above, as we didn￿ t need them to estimate the other parameters
of the model.
31See, for example, Bernard and Jensen (1999), Lach, Roberts, and Tybout (1997), and BEJK (2003).
43simple analytic expression we ￿rst look at the productivity of a ￿rm￿ s operations in selling to
a particular market n. We de￿ne its value added Vn(j) in market n as:
Vn(j) = Xn(j) ￿ In(j)
where In(j) is ￿rm j￿ s spending on intermediates to supply that market. We calculate this
intermediate spending as:
In(j) = (1 ￿ ￿)m
￿1Xn(j) + (1 ￿ ￿
F)En(j);
where ￿ is the share of factor costs in variable costs and ￿
F is the share of factor costs in ￿xed
costs.

















The only source of cross-￿rm heterogeneity in productivity arises through the ratio En(j)=Xn(j):
Firms having more sales Xn(j) relative to entry costs En(j) are more productive.32
Using (23) for the numerator and (30) for the denominator, exploiting (34), we can write






vn(j)(1￿￿)=e ￿ ￿ 1
vn(j)￿￿=e ￿ ￿ 1
:
32While in the actual data we look at value added per worker, it is more direct to calculate our model￿ s
prediction for value added per unit of factor cost. In our model the two are proportional since we assume that
all producers in a country face the same wage and input costs, with labor having the same share.
44More e¢ cient ￿rms will typically have a low ratio of entry costs to sales and hence, according
to (44), relatively high productivity.33
Since vn(j) is distributed uniformly on [0;1]; in any market n the distribution of the ratio
of ￿xed costs to sales revenue, and hence the distribution of productivity, is invariant to any
market-speci￿c feature such as size or location. In particular, the distribution of productivity
is not a⁄ected by trade openness.
What we have said so far applies to the productivity of units selling in a market, which
are not the same thing as the ￿rms producing there. To measure the overall productivity of
a ￿rm we need to sum its sales, value added, and factor costs across its activities in di⁄erent
markets. De￿ning total sales X(j) =
P
n Xn(j) and total entry costs E(j) =
P
n En(j); ￿rm
j￿ s productivity is:
q(j) =





To simplify we assume ￿
F = 0 so that all ￿xed costs are purchased services. We then calibrate
￿ from data on the share of manufacturing value added in gross production.34







vn(j)￿1=e ￿ ￿ 1
￿:
For any ￿ the ratio of entry costs to sales is bounded between 0 for the most e¢ cient ￿rms (vn(j) near zero)
and 1=￿ for the least e¢ cient (vn(j) near one) entering country n. Their productivity in market n is thus
bounded between 1 and [m ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)]=￿. A higher m or lower ￿ will generate more variation in productivity.
34Denoting the value-added share as V; averaging across UNIDO gives us V = 0:36: Taking into account
pro￿ts and ￿xed costs we calculate:
￿ = mV ￿ 1=￿;
so that ￿ is determined from V simultaneously with our estimates of m and ￿:
45Note that the expression for ￿rm productivity (45) depends on the elasticity of substitution
￿ (through m = ￿=(￿￿1)) but not on ￿: Following BEJK (2003) we ￿nd an m that makes the
productivity advantage of exporters in our simulated data match their productivity advantage
in the actual data (1:22): This exercise delivers m = 1:51 or ￿ = 2:98; implying ￿ = 0:34:
Using our estimate of e ￿ = ￿=(￿ ￿ 1) = 2:46 the implied value of ￿ is 4:87.35
Figure 6 reports average value added per worker against the minimum number of markets
where the ￿rms sell. We normalize the average of all ￿rms (including nonexporters) to one.
Circles represent the actual data and x￿ s our simulation, based on (45) with m = 1:51. Note
that, among the actual ￿rms, value added per worker more than doubles as we move from all
of our ￿rms (selling in at least one market) to those selling to at least 74 markets, and then
plummets as we look at ￿rms that sell more widely (although we are looking at fewer than
one hundred ￿rms in this upper tail). The model picks up the rise in measured productivity
corresponding to wider entry at the low end (representing the vast majority of ￿rms) but fails
to reproduce the spike at the high end.
4.9 The Home Market E⁄ect
With values for the individual parameters ￿ and ￿ we can return to equation (14) and ask
how much better o⁄ are buyers in a larger market. Taking En as given, the elasticity of Pn
with respect to Xn is ￿0:30: Doubling market size leads to a 30 percent lower manufacturing
35While the model here is di⁄erent, footnote 9 suggests that the parameter ￿ plays a similar role here to its
role in Eaton and Kortum (2002) and in BEJK (2003). Our estimate of ￿ = 4:87 falls between the estimates
of 8.28 and 3.60, respectively, from those papers. Our estimate of ￿ = 2:98 is not far below the estimate of
3.79 from BEJK (2003).
46price index. Recall, however, that our analysis inspired by the relationship (32) suggested that
entry costs rise with market size, with an elasticity of 0:31: Putting these two calculations
together, however, still leaves us with an elasticity of ￿0:21: Our results imply a substantially
lower price index in larger markets.
5 General Equilibrium and Counterfactuals
We now consider how changes in policy and the environment would a⁄ect individual ￿rms.
To do so we need to consider how such changes would a⁄ect wages and prices. So far we have
conditioned on a given equilibrium outcome. We now have to ask how the world reequilibrates.
5.1 Embedding the Model in a General Equilibrium Framework
Embedding our analysis in general equilibrium requires additional assumptions:
1. Factors are as in Ricardo (1821). Each country is endowed with an amount Li of labor
(or a composite factor), which is freely mobile across activities within a country but
does not migrate. Its wage in country i is Wi.
2. Intermediates are as in Eaton and Kortum (2002). Consistent with Section 4:8; man-
ufacturing inputs are a Cobb-Douglas combination of labor and intermediates, where






where ￿ is the labor share and ￿3 = ￿
￿￿(1 ￿ ￿)￿(1￿￿):
473. Nonmanufacturing is as in Alvarez and Lucas (2007). Final output, which is nontraded,
is a Cobb-Douglas combination of manufactures and labor, with manufactures having a
share ￿: Labor is the only input into nonmanufactures. Hence the price of ￿nal output





4. Fixed costs pay labor in the destination. We thus decompose the country-speci￿c com-
ponent of the entry cost En = WnFn; where Fn re￿ ects the e¢ ciency of workers in
country n in producing the entry cost component of production.36
Equilibrium in the world market for manufactures requires that the sum across countries





To determine equilibrium wages around the world requires that we turn these expressions into
conditions for equilibrium in world labor markets.






i ) + [(1 ￿ ￿)(￿ ￿ 1)=￿]Yi (47)
where Y A
i is GDP and DA
i the trade de￿cit. Since our model is static we treat de￿cits as
exogenous.
To relate Y A
i to wages we write:
Y
A
i = WiLi + ￿i; (48)
36Combined with our treatment of ￿xed costs as intermediates in our analysis of ￿rm-level productivity,
assumption 4 implies that these workers are outsourced manufacturing labor.
48where ￿i are total net pro￿ts earned by country i￿ s manufacturing producers from their sales
at home and abroad.
Net pro￿ts earned in destination n both by domestic ￿rms and by exporters selling there,
which we denote ￿D


















where the second equality comes from applying the conditions (46) for equilibrium in the
market for manufactures.
Substituting (48) into (47) and using the fact that gross manufacturing production Yi is
gross manufacturing absorption Xi less the manufacturing trade de￿cit Di:37





















1 + (￿ ￿ 1)(￿ ￿ ￿=￿)
: (50)







￿ (￿ ￿ 1)(1 ￿ ￿ + ￿=￿)Dn
1 + (￿ ￿ 1)(￿ ￿ ￿=￿)
: (51)
37For simplicity we reconcile the di⁄erences between manufacturing and overall trade de￿cits by thinking
of them as transfers of the ￿nal good, which is otherwise not traded. For large economies, the manufacturing
de￿cit is the largest component of the overall trade de￿cit. See Dekle, Eaton, and Kortum (2008) for a fuller
treatment of de￿cits in a similar model of bilateral trade.



















Substituting (50), (51), and (52) into (46) gives us a set of equations determining wages Wi


















giving us prices Pi around the world given wages Wi:
5.2 Calculating Counterfactual Outcomes
We could use (46) and (53) together to see how changes in Ti;Li;Fi;Di;DA
i , or dni anywhere
would a⁄ect wages Wi and manufacturing price indices Pi around the world (for given values
of ￿;￿;￿;￿; and ￿1). Here we limit ourselves to considering the e⁄ect of changes in trade
barriers dni and in entry costs Fi.38
We apply the method explained in Dekle, Eaton, and Kortum (henceforth DEK, 2008) to
calculate counterfactuals.39 Denote the counterfactual value of any variable x as x0 and de￿ne











We can write each of the components in terms of each country￿ s baseline labor income, Y L
i =
WiLi; baseline trade shares ￿ni; baseline de￿cits, and the change in wages c Wi and prices b Pi
38We thus treat de￿cits as unchanged (as a share of world GDP).
39DEK (2008) calculated counterfactual equilibria in a perfectly competitive 44-country world. Here we
adopt their procedure to accommodate the complications posed by monopolistic competition and ￿rm hetero-
geneity, expanding coverage to 114 countries (our 113 plus rest of world).


















n c Wn + DA
n
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￿ (￿ ￿ 1)(1 ￿ ￿ + ￿=￿)Dn


















where sticking these three equations into (54) yields a set of equations involving c Wi￿ s for given














c Wn b Fn
!(1=￿)￿1=(￿￿1)
: (55)
We implement counterfactual simulations for our 113 countries in 1986, aggregating the
rest of the world into a 114th country (ROW). We calibrate the ￿ni with data on trade shares.
We calibrate ￿ = 0:34 (common across countries) as described in Section 4.8 and Y L
i and
country-speci￿c ￿i￿ s from data on manufacturing production and trade. Appendix B describes
our sources of data and our procedures for assembling them to execute the counterfactual.
A simple iterative algorithm solves jointly for changes in wages and prices, giving us
c Wn, b Pn, b ￿ni, and b Xn. From these values we calculate: (i) the implied change in French
exports in each market n, using the French price index for manufactures as numeraire, as
b XnF = b ￿nF b Xn=b PF and (ii) the change in the number of French ￿rms selling there, using (31),
as b NnF =
￿




c Wn b Fn
￿
.
We then calculate the implications of this change for individual ￿rms. We hold ￿xed all of
the ￿rm-speci￿c shocks that underlie ￿rm heterogeneity in order to isolate the microeconomic
changes brought about by general-equilibrium forces. We produce a dataset, recording both
baseline and counterfactual ￿rm-level behavior, as follows:
511. We apply the changes b XnF and b NnF to our original data set to get counterfactual values
of total French sales in each market XC
nF and the number of French sellers there NC
nF:40
2. We run the simulation described in Section 4.2 with S = 500;000 and the same stochastic
draws applying both to the baseline and the counterfactual. We set ￿ to the parameter
estimates reported in Section 4.5. To accommodate counterfactuals, we tweaked our
algorithm in four places:
(a) In step 2, we use our baseline values XnF and NnF to calculate baseline ￿En￿ s and
our counterfactual values XC
nF and NC
nF to calculate counterfactual ￿EC
n ￿ s in each
destination.
(b) In step 4 we use our baseline values XnF and NnF to calculate baseline un(s)￿ s and
our counterfactual values XC
nF and NC
nF to calculate counterfactual uC
n(s)￿ s for each
destination and ￿rm, using (32) and (40).





A ￿rm for which u(s) ￿ un(s) sells in market n in the baseline while a ￿rm for
which u(s) ￿ uC
n(s) sells there in the counterfactual. Hence our simulation allows
for entry, exit, and survival.
40Recall that, for reasons such as manufacturing exports by nonmanufacturing ￿rms, the aggregate exports
described in Appendix B exceed total exports by our French ￿rms. Having used the aggregate data to calculate
the counterfactual equilibrium as described in the previous section, we applied the percentage changes from
that exercise to the XnF and NnF in our ￿rm dataset.
52(d) In step 7 we calculate entry and sales in each of the 113 markets in the baseline
and in the counterfactual.
5.3 Counterfactual Results
We consider two counterfactuals. The ￿rst is a ten percent drop in trade barriers, i.e., b dni =
1=(1:1) for i 6= n and b dnn = b Fn = 1. This change roughly replicates the increase in French
import share over the decade following 1986.41 The second is a ten percent drop in entry costs
around the world, i.e. b Fn = 1=(1:1) and b dni = 1. We describe the results in turn.
5.3.1 Implications of Globalization
Table 3 shows the aggregate general equilibrium consequences of ten percent lower trade costs:




, (ii) the change in the relative wage c Wn=c WF,
the change in the sales of French ￿rms to each market b XnF, and the change in the number
of French ￿rms selling to each market b NnF. Lower trade barriers raise the real wage in every
country, typically by less than 5 percent.42 Relative wages move quite a bit more, capturing
terms of trade e⁄ects from globalization. The results that matter at the ￿rm level are French
41Using time-series data from the OECD￿ s STAN database, we calculated the ratio of manufacturing im-
ports to manufacturing absorption (gross production + imports - exports) for the 16 OECD countries with
uninterrupted annual data from 1986-2000. By 1997 this share had risen for all 16 countries, with a minimum
increase of 2.4 for Norway and a maximum of 21.1 percentage points for Belgium. France, with a 10.0 and
Greece with an 11.0 percentage point increase straddled the median.
42There are a several outliers on the upper end, with Belgium experiencing a 9 percent gain, Singapore a
24 percent gain, and Liberia a 49 percent gain. These results are associated with anomalies in the trade data
due to entrepot trade or (for Liberia) ships. These anomalies have little consequence for our overall results.
53sales and the number of French ￿rms active in each market. While French sales declines
by 5 percent in the home market, exports increase substantially, with a maximum 80 percent
increase in Japan.43 The number of French exporters increases roughly in parallel with French
exports.
Table 4 summarizes the results, which are dramatic. Total sales by French ￿rms rise by
$16.4 million, the net e⁄ect of a $34.5 million increase in exports and a $18.1 million decline
in domestic sales. Despite this rise in total sales, competition from imports drives almost 27
thousand ￿rms out of business, although almost 11 thousand ￿rms start exporting.
Tables 5 and 6 decompose these changes into the contributions of ￿rms of di⁄erent baseline
size, with Table 5 considering the counts of ￿rms. Nearly half the ￿rms in the bottom decile
are wiped out while only the top percentile avoids any attrition. Because so many ￿rms in
the top decile already export, the greatest number of new exporters emerge from the second
highest decile. The biggest percentage increase in number of exporters is for ￿rms in the third
from the bottom decile.
Table 6 decomposes sales revenues. All of the increase is in the top decile, and most of that
43A good predictor of the change in country n￿ s relative wage is its baseline share of exports in manufacturing
production, as the terms of trade favor small open economies as trade barriers decline. A regression in logs
across the 112 export destinations yields an R2 of 0.72.
A good predictor of the change in French exports to n comes from log-linearizing ￿nF, noting that lnXnF =
ln￿nF +lnXn. The variable capturing the change in French cost advantage relative to domestic producers in
n is x1 = ￿nn
h
￿ ln(c Wn=c WF) ￿ ln b dnF
i
with a predicted elasticity of ￿ (we ignore changes in the relative value
of the manufacturing price index, since they are small). The variable capturing the percentage change in n￿ s
absorption is x2 = ln c Wn with a predicted elasticity of 1. A regression across the 112 export destinations of
lnXnF on x1 and x2 yields an R2 of 0.88 with a coe¢ cient on x1 of 5.66 and on x2 of 1.30.
54in the top percentile. For every other decile sales decline. Almost two-thirds of the increase
in export revenue is from the top percentile, although lower deciles experience much higher
percentage increases in their export revenues.
Comparing the numbers in Tables 5 and 6 reveals that, even among survivors, revenue per
￿rm falls in every decile except the top. In summary, the decline in trade barriers improves
the performance of the very top ￿rms at the expense of the rest.44
In results not shown we decompose the ￿ndings according to the number of markets where
￿rms initially sold. Most of the increase in export revenues is among the ￿rms that were
already exporting most widely. But the percentage increase falls with the initial number of
markets served. For ￿rms that initially export to few markets, a substantial share of export
growth comes from entering new markets.
Finally, we can also look at what happens in each foreign market. Very little of the increase
in exports to each market is due to entry (the extensive margin). We can also look at growth
in sales by incumbent ￿rms. As Arkolakis (2008) would predict, sales by ￿rms with an initially
smaller presence grow substantially more than those at the top.
5.3.2 Implications of Lower Entry Costs
Our counterfactual of 10 percent lower entry costs yields very stark results. Changes in entry
costs enter directly only in equation (55), leading to lower prices. But, since we assume a
common drop in entry costs, manufacturing price indices drop in parallel, with trade shares
and relative wages unchanged. We can thus solve analytically for the common change in
44The ￿rst row of the tables pertains to ￿rms that entered only to export. There are only 1108 of them
selling a total of $4 million.
55manufacturing prices:
b P = b F
[￿￿(￿￿1)]=[￿￿(￿￿1)] = 0:919:
The number of French ￿rms selling in every market rises by 10 percent and sales (in terms
of the prices of manufactures) change by the factor 1=0:919 = 1:088 in each market. Of the
10 percent increase in French ￿rms, just over 1 percent enter as exporters. The increase in
the number of French exporters comes primarily from the upper end of the size distribution
of incumbent ￿rms, although the percentage increase in the number of exporters is greatest
near the middle of the distribution. While incumbent ￿rms expand into more markets, entry
of new, small ￿rms leaves the size distribution essentially unchanged.
6 Conclusion
We examine some key features of the sales of French ￿rms across 113 di⁄erent markets,
including France itself. Much of what we see can be interpreted in terms of a standard model
of heterogeneous producers. We think that the model provides a useful tool for linking what
goes on at the aggregate level with the situation of individual ￿rms.
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A Appendix A: Constructing the Firm Level Data
Up to 1992 all shipments of goods entering or leaving France were declared to French customs
either by their owners or by authorized customs commissioners. These declarations constitute
the basis of all French trade statistics. Each shipment generates a record. Each record contains
the ￿rm identi￿er, the SIREN, the country of origin (for imports) or destination (for exports),
a product identi￿er (a 6-digit classi￿cation), and a date. All records are aggregated ￿rst at
the monthly level. In the analysis ￿les accessible to researchers, these records are further
aggregated by year and by 3-digit product (NAP 100 classi￿cation, the equivalent of the 3-
digit SIC code). Therefore, each observation is identi￿ed by a SIREN, a NAP code, a country
code, an import or export code, and a year. In our analysis, we restrict attention to exporting
￿rms in the manufacturing sector in year 1986 and in year 1992. Hence, we aggregate across
manufacturing products exported. We can thus measure each ￿rm￿ s amount of total exports
in years 1986 and 1992 by country of destination. Transactions are recorded in French Francs
and re￿ ect the amount received by the ￿rm (i.e., including discounts, rebates, etc.). Even
though our ￿le is exhaustive, i.e., all exported goods are present, direct aggregation of all
60movements may di⁄er from published trade statistics, the second being based on list prices
and thus excluding rebates.
We match this ￿le with the Base d￿ Analyse Longitudinale, SystŁme Uni￿Ø de Statistiques
d￿ Entreprises (BAL-SUSE) database, which provides ￿rm-level information. The BAL-SUSE
database is constructed from the mandatory reports of French ￿rms to the ￿scal administra-
tion. These reports are then transmitted to INSEE where the data are validated. It includes
all ￿rms subject to the ￿BØnØ￿ces Industriels et Commerciaux￿regime, a ￿scal regime manda-
tory for all manufacturing ￿rms with a turnover above 3,000,000FF in 1990 (1,000,000FF in
the service sector). In 1990, these ￿rms comprised more than 60% of the total number of ￿rms
in France while their turnover comprised more than 94% of total turnover of ￿rms in France.
Hence, the BAL-SUSE is representative of French enterprises in all sectors except the public
sector.
From this source, we gather balance sheet information (total sales, total labor costs, total
wage-bill, sales, value-added, total employment). Matching the Customs database and the
BAL-SUSE database leaves us 229,900 ￿rms in manufacturing (excluding construction, min-
ing and oil industries) in 1986 with valid information on sales and exports. All values are
translated into U.S. dollars at the 1986 exchange rate.
61A Appendix B: The Data for Counterfactuals
For each country n, data on GDP Y A
n and the trade de￿cit in goods and services DA
n are from
the United Nations Statistics Division (2007).45 We took total absorption of manufactures
Xn from our earlier work, EKK (2004). Bilateral trade in manufactures is from Feenstra,
Lipsey and Bowen (1997). Starting with the ￿le WBEA86.ASC, we aggregate across all
manufacturing industries. Given these trade ￿ ows ￿niXn we calculate the share of exporter i
in n￿ s purchases ￿ni and manufacturing trade de￿cits Dn. The home shares ￿ii are residuals.
The shares of manufactures in ￿nal output ￿n are calibrated to achieve consistency between
our observations for the aggregate economy and the manufacturing sector.46 In particular:
￿n =





We exploit (48), (49), and (50) in order to derive baseline labor Y L





[1 + (￿ ￿ 1)(￿ ￿ ￿n=￿)]Y A
i ￿ [(￿ ￿ 1)￿n=￿]DA
i + [(￿ ￿ 1)=￿]Di
1 + (￿ ￿ 1)￿
:
All data are for 1986, translated into U.S. dollars at the 1986 exchange rate. See DEK (2008)
for further details.
45A couple of observations were missing from the data available on line. To separate GDP between East
and West Germany, we went to the 1992 hardcopy. For the USSR and Czechoslovakia, we set the trade de￿cit
in goods and services equal to the trade de￿cit in manufactures.
46The value of ￿n lies in the interval (0:15;0:55) for 100 or our 113 countries. The average is 0.36.
62Country
Belgium* (BE) 17,699 0.520
Germany (DE) 14,579 0.428
Switzerland (CH 14,173 0.416
Italy (IT) 10,643 0.313
United Kingdom (UK) 9,752 0.287
Netherlands (NL) 8,294 0.244
United States (US) 7,608 0.224
Total Exporters 34,035  
* Belgium includes Luxembourg
Export String Data
BE* 3,988 1,700 4,417
BE-DE 863 1,274 912
BE-DE-CH 579 909 402
BE-DE-CH-IT 330 414 275
BE-DE-CH-IT-UK 313 166 297
BE-DE-CH-IT-UK-NL 781 54 505
BE-DE-CH-IT-UK-NL-US 2,406 15 2,840
Total 9,260 4,532 9,648
* The string "BE" means selling to Belgium but no other among the top 7,    "BE-DE" means 
selling to Belgium and Germany but no other, etc.
Fraction of 
Exporters




Table 2 - French Firms Selling to Strings of Top Seven Countries












AFGHANISTAN AFG 1.01 0.92 1.22 1.23
ALBANIA ALB 1.01 0.94 1.35 1.34
ALGERIA ALG 1.00 0.90 1.09 1.12
ANGOLA ANG 1.00 0.90 1.08 1.10
ARGENTINA ARG 1.01 0.96 1.57 1.52
AUSTRALIA AUL 1.02 0.96 1.35 1.29
AUSTRIA AUT 1.04 1.04 1.49 1.32
BANGLADESH BAN 1.01 0.95 1.37 1.33
BELGIUM* BEL 1.09 1.11 1.44 1.19
BENIN BEN 1.02 0.94 1.12 1.09
BOLIVIA BOL 1.02 0.94 1.21 1.18
BRAZIL BRA 1.01 0.96 1.64 1.57
BULGARIA BUL 1.02 0.95 1.38 1.34
BURKINA FASO BUK 1.01 0.93 1.17 1.17
BURUNDI BUR 1.01 0.92 1.21 1.21
CAMEROON CAM 1.01 0.92 1.19 1.19
CANADA CAN 1.04 1.05 1.43 1.26
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC CEN 1.02 1.03 1.33 1.20
CHAD CHA 1.01 0.90 1.07 1.10
CHILE CHI 1.03 1.02 1.53 1.38
CHINA CHN 1.01 0.94 1.38 1.36
COLOMBIA COL 1.01 0.92 1.22 1.23
COSTA RICA COS 1.02 0.94 1.22 1.20
COTE D'IVOIRE COT 1.03 0.98 1.36 1.28
CUBA CUB 1.01 0.93 1.26 1.24
CZECHOSLOVAKIA CZE 1.03 1.01 1.52 1.38
DENMARK DEN 1.04 1.06 1.46 1.27
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC DOM 1.04 0.99 1.36 1.28
ECUADOR ECU 1.02 0.96 1.33 1.28
EGYPT EGY 1.02 0.92 1.12 1.12
EL SALVADOR ELS 1.02 0.93 1.10 1.10
ETHIOPIA ETH 1.01 0.92 1.08 1.09
FINLAND FIN 1.03 1.02 1.53 1.38
FRANCE FRA 1.02 1.00 0.95 0.88
GERMANY, EAST GEE 1.01 0.96 1.58 1.52
GERMANY, WEST GER 1.03 1.02 1.60 1.45
GHANA GHA 1.02 0.99 1.38 1.28
GREECE GRE 1.02 0.97 1.37 1.30
GUATEMALA GUA 1.01 0.92 1.16 1.17
HONDURAS HON 1.02 0.95 1.19 1.16
HONG KONG HOK 1.14 1.20 1.33 1.02
HUNGARY HUN 1.05 1.04 1.41 1.25
INDIA IND 1.01 0.95 1.40 1.37
INDONESIA INO 1.02 0.96 1.44 1.38
IRAN IRN 1.01 0.93 1.16 1.16
IRAQ IRQ 1.04 0.94 1.08 1.06
IRELAND IRE 1.07 1.09 1.43 1.21
ISRAEL ISR 1.04 1.01 1.44 1.31
ITALY ITA 1.02 0.99 1.57 1.46
JAMAICA JAM 1.05 1.02 1.35 1.22
JAPAN JAP 1.01 0.98 1.80 1.69
JORDAN JOR 1.03 0.95 1.16 1.13
KENYA KEN 1.01 0.93 1.18 1.18
KOREA, SOUTH KOR 1.04 1.04 1.58 1.40
KUWAIT KUW 1.02 0.94 1.14 1.12
* Belgium includes Luxembourg
Table 3 - Aggregate Outcomes of Counterfactual Experiment (first of two panels)
Counterfactual Changes











LIBERIA LIB 1.49 1.03 1.27 1.14
LIBYA LIY 1.02 0.95 1.10 1.07
MADAGASCAR MAD 1.01 0.94 1.22 1.20
MALAWI MAW 1.01 0.92 1.17 1.17
MALAYSIA MAY 1.07 1.08 1.45 1.23
MALI MAL 1.02 0.95 1.15 1.12
MAURITANIA MAU 1.08 1.19 1.36 1.05
MAURITIUS MAS 1.07 1.05 1.47 1.29
MEXICO MEX 1.01 0.94 1.32 1.30
MOROCCO MOR 1.02 0.98 1.37 1.30
MOZAMBIQUE MOZ 1.01 0.94 1.29 1.26
NEPAL NEP 1.01 1.01 1.35 1.24
NETHERLANDS NET 1.06 1.14 1.41 1.14
NEW ZEALAND NZE 1.03 1.00 1.45 1.33
NICARAGUA NIC 1.01 0.89 1.06 1.09
NIGER NIG 1.02 1.09 1.47 1.25
NIGERIA NIA 1.00 0.89 1.07 1.12
NORWAY NOR 1.04 1.03 1.38 1.23
OMAN OMA 1.04 0.99 1.11 1.03
PAKISTAN PAK 1.02 0.97 1.41 1.34
PANAMA PAN 1.09 0.96 1.15 1.10
PAPUA NEW GUINEA PAP 1.07 1.09 1.33 1.13
PARAGUAY PAR 1.01 0.93 1.21 1.20
PERU PER 1.02 0.97 1.39 1.32
PHILIPPIPINES PHI 1.02 0.97 1.50 1.43
PORTUGAL POR 1.03 1.03 1.47 1.32
ROMANIA ROM 1.01 0.97 1.68 1.61
RWANDA RWA 1.00 0.90 1.14 1.17
SAUDI ARABIA SAU 1.02 0.95 1.15 1.11
SENEGAL SEN 1.03 1.01 1.36 1.24
SIERRA LEONE SIE 1.03 1.17 1.36 1.08
SINGAPORE SIN 1.24 1.15 1.37 1.10
SOMALIA SOM 1.03 0.96 1.09 1.05
SOUTH AFRICA SOU 1.03 1.01 1.56 1.43
SPAIN SPA 1.02 0.97 1.49 1.42
SRI LANKA SRI 1.03 0.99 1.34 1.24
SUDAN SUD 1.00 0.91 1.13 1.15
SWEDEN SWE 1.04 1.05 1.51 1.33
SWITZERLAND SWI 1.05 1.05 1.48 1.31
SYRIA SYR 1.02 0.96 1.20 1.15
TAIWAN TAI 1.04 1.05 1.64 1.44
TANZANIA TAN 1.01 0.94 1.15 1.13
THAILAND THA 1.03 0.99 1.50 1.40
TOGO TOG 1.03 0.96 1.11 1.07
TRINIDAD AND TOBOGO TRI 1.04 1.01 1.22 1.12
TUNISIA TUN 1.04 1.00 1.36 1.26
TURKEY TUR 1.01 0.95 1.37 1.33
UGANDA UGA 1.00 0.90 1.06 1.08
UNITED KINGDOM UNK 1.03 1.00 1.46 1.35
UNITED STATES USA 1.01 0.96 1.45 1.40
URUGUAY URU 1.02 1.00 1.65 1.53
USSR USR 1.00 0.92 1.32 1.33
VENEZUELA VEN 1.01 0.91 1.18 1.20
VIETNAM VIE 1.01 0.95 1.37 1.33
YUGOSLAVIA YUG 1.02 0.97 1.48 1.41
ZAIRE ZAI 1.06 1.21 1.37 1.04
ZAMBIA ZAM 1.03 1.12 1.49 1.22
ZIMBABWE ZIM 1.02 0.97 1.43 1.36
Counterfactual Changes







  All Firms 231,402 -26,589 -11.5
  Exporting 32,969 10,716 32.5
Values ($ millions):
  Total Sales 436,144 16,442 3.8
  Domestic Sales 362,386 -18,093 -5.0
  Exports 73,758 34,534 46.8
  Counterfactual simulation of a 10% decline in trade costs.
Table 4 - Counterfactuals: Firm Totals
Counterfactual 
 


















not active 0 1,118 ---   0 1,118 ---
0 to 10 23,140 -11,551 -49.9 767 15 2.0
10 to 20 23,140 -5,702 -24.6 141 78 55.1
20 to 30 23,140 -3,759 -16.2 181 192 106.1
30 to 40 23,140 -2,486 -10.7 357 357 100.0
40 to 50 23,140 -1,704 -7.4 742 614 82.8
50 to 60 23,138 -1,141 -4.9 1,392 904 65.0
60 to 70 23,142 -726 -3.1 2,450 1,343 54.8
70 to 80 23,140 -405 -1.8 4,286 1,829 42.7
80 to 90 23,140 -195 -0.8 7,677 2,290 29.8
90 to 99 20,826 -38 -0.2 12,807 1,915 15.0
99 to 100 2,314 0 0.0 2,169 62 2.8
Totals 231,402 -26,589 32,969 10,716
 
 


















not active 0 3 --- 0 3 ---
0 to 10 41 -24 -58.0 1 2 345.4
10 to 20 190 -91 -47.7 1 2 260.3
20 to 30 469 -183 -39.0 1 3 266.7
30 to 40 953 -308 -32.3 2 7 391.9
40 to 50 1,793 -476 -26.6 6 18 307.8
50 to 60 3,299 -712 -21.6 18 48 269.7
60 to 70 6,188 -1,043 -16.9 58 130 223.0
70 to 80 12,548 -1,506 -12.0 206 391 189.5
80 to 90 31,268 -1,951 -6.2 1,085 1,501 138.4
90 to 99 148,676 4,029 2.7 16,080 11,943 74.3
99 to 100 230,718 18,703 8.1 56,301 20,486 36.4
Totals 436,144 16,442 73,758 34,534
Table 5 - Counterfactuals: Firm Entry and Exit by Initial Size
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Panel C: Sales Percentiles
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Panel B: Sales and # Penetrating Multiple Markets
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Panel C: Sales and # Selling to a Market
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Panel D: Distribution of Sales and Market Entry
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Panel C: Export Intensity by Market
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Figure 6: Productivity and Markets Penetrated